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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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BENJAMAN T. HINES, JR. ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 45788
BINGHAM COUNTY NO. CR-2017-5026

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Benjaman Hines, Jr., pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, and the district
court sentenced him to seven years, with one and one-half years fixed. Mr. Hines appeals, and he
argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State alleged Mr. Hines committed the crimes of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a pipe, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A(1). (R., pp.9–10.) These allegations arose
from the execution of an agent’s warrant on Mr. Hines. (Presentence Investigation Report
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(“PSI”),1 p.3.) At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offenses
and bound Mr. Hines over to district court. (R., pp.48–49, 54–55.) The State filed an Information
charging Mr. Hines with possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia.
(R., pp.56–57.) The State also charged Mr. Hines with the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement. (R., pp.58–59.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Hines pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance. (R., pp.117–19; 12/1/17 Entry of Plea Tr.,2 p.5, L.23–p.6, L.5, p.12, Ls.19–
22.) The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge and the sentencing enhancement.
(R., pp.117–19.)
At sentencing, the State recommended the district court impose a sentence of seven years,
with three years fixed. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.12, Ls.7–9.) Mr. Hines requested probation.
(1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.12, Ls.22–24.) The district court sentenced him to seven years, with
one and one-half years fixed. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.20, Ls.1–5.) Mr. Hines timely appealed
from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.170–72, 175.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Hines to seven years, with one
and one-half years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance?
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Citations to the PSI refer to the seventy-one page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
2
There are multiple transcripts on appeal. Each will be cited with reference to the date and
proceeding type.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Hines To Seven Years, With
One And One-Half Years Fixed, For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Hines’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c) (seven years maximum). Accordingly, to show that the
sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Hines “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). Similarly,
“[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
In the case at bar, Mr. Hines asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
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court should have placed him on probation or imposed a lesser sentence in light of the mitigating
factors, including his amenability towards treatment, acceptance of responsibility, and remorse.
Mr. Hines has struggled with alcohol and drug addiction for his entire adult life. (PSI,
pp.20–21.) The GAIN Evaluation diagnosed him with a severe substance abuse disorder and
recommended Level 3.5 residential treatment. (PSI, pp.21, 28, 40.) Unfortunately, due to his
substance abuse, Mr. Hines has been incarcerated or on probation throughout his life. (PSI, p.15.)
He recognized, however, that his substance abuse issues are the “root” of his legal issues. (PSI,
p.21.) He admitted that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the instant
offense and was “[a]stonished” by his stupidity. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Hines’s substance abuse issues,
acceptance of responsibility, and remorse support a lesser sentence, including probation.
Despite his relapses, Mr. Hines was fully committed to remaining sober and becoming a
contributing member of society. The GAIN Evaluation found that he showed “high motivation
for treatment.” (PSI, p.35.) Mr. Hines explained to the district court that he was successful on
parole for over a year before committing the instant offense. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.12, L.25;
PSI, p.21.) Once he was released in August 2016, Mr. Hines maintained a stable residence. (PSI,
pp.16–17.) He also obtained employment with Yellowstone Plastics. (PSI, p.19.) He worked
there from October 2016 until his relapse in March 2017. (PSI, p.19.) This thirteen-month period
was the longest period of time that he had been successful on parole since 1985. (1/29/18
Sentencing Tr., p.12, L.25–p.13, L.1, p.14, Ls.17–19.) Following the instant offense, Mr. Hines
explained that he was “really trying to do things different.” (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.13, L.4.)
The “biggest different” this time around was his age. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.16, L.25–p.17,
L.2.) At forty-seven years old, Mr. Hines was “tired” of this lifestyle. (1/29/18 Sentencing
Tr., p.17, Ls.1–2; PSI, p.1.) He wanted “nothing more than just to be the best father that I can be
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for my children.” (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.17, Ls.2–3.) Mr. Hines had three children, and his
children were “everything” to him. (PSI, pp.17, 22.) His goal was to be a good parent to them.
(PSI, p.22.) He also valued his employment. (PSI, p.22.) He was “confident” that he could
succeed on probation. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.17, Ls.3–4.) Although Mr. Hines recognized
that recovery was “hard” and wished that he could “take back” his relapse, he knew that he could
remain sober this time. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.17, Ls.12–17.) Mr. Hines’s dedication to a
sober and crime-free lifestyle is a mitigating factor in support of a lesser sentence, including
probation.
Along with his high motivation for treatment, Mr. Hines developed a treatment plan to
remain sober while on probation. For one, Mr. Hines had a very positive relationship with his
supervising officer. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.13, Ls.8–9, p.14, Ls.15–19.) Additionally, he
contacted BPA and Tueller Counseling for in-patient treatment and aftercare. (1/29/18
Sentencing Tr., p.14, Ls.1–9, p.15, Ls.11–19.) BPA had funding available for him to start
inpatient care upon his release. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.11–p.16, L.4.) Mr. Hines also
started a fifty-two week domestic violence course. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.14, Ls.10–13.) In
addition to his treatment plan, Yellowstone Plastics wanted to hire him back if he was placed on
probation. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.16, Ls.11–14.) Mr. Hines also had a driver’s license, a
vehicle to drive to work and to treatment, and a stable residence. (1/29/18 Sentencing Tr., p.16,
Ls.17–16.) Mr. Hines’s treatment plan, employment and housing options, and good relationship
with his supervising officer also stand in favor of mitigation.
In summary, these facts show that Mr. Hines had rehabilitative potential under proper
control and supervision in the community. The mitigating factors support probation or a lesser
sentence for Mr. Hines. By failing to give adequate weight to these strong mitigating factors, the
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district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hines respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, including probation. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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